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THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION ON




rom Confucius’s teachings to the rabbi or priest resolving
disputes in the community, the idea of mediation, in con-
cept if not in name, is prevalent throughout much of human
civilization.1 Mediation is, in short, “[n]egotiation facilitated by
a trusted neutral person.”2 The neutrality and impartiality of
that third party, the mediator, is crucial to the process.3 Media-
tors help facilitate the negotiating process with the end goal of
having the parties reach a consensus.4 Unlike a judge or an ar-
bitrator however, the mediator is not a decision maker or adju-
dicator.5 Although mediation can sometimes be required by
court or a procedural process, it is most often—and always in
spirit—a voluntary process.6
There are three main forms of mediation.7 First, there is “fa-
cilitative” mediation, where, as the name suggests, the media-
tor works to facilitate communication between the parties, en-
suring that they understand the other’s perspective.8 The end
goal of this form of mediation is to assist the parties in reach-
1. See generally Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History and Dimen-
sions of Practice, 1983 MEDIATION Q. 3 (1983).
2. Michael Leathes, Stop Shovelling Smoke! Give users a classic defini-
tion of mediation, INT’L. MEDIATION INST., https://
www.imimediation.org/2011/08/30/stop-shovelling-smoke-give-users-classic-
definition-mediation/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2020).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Mediation: Frequently Asked Questions, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/mediation/guide/index.html#whatis (last visited
July 3, 2019).
6. See id.; Lucia Valentová, Mandatory Mediation in Family Law Issues
with Domestic Violence – Limits and Experience from USA, 15 INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 103, 106–114 (2015); Jennifer Winestone, Mandatory Mediation: A
Comparative Review of How Legislatures in California and Ontario are Man-
dating the Peacemaking Process In Their Adversarial Systems, MEDIATE (Feb.
2015), https://www.mediate.com/articles/WinestoneJ4.cfm.
7. Thomas Gaultier, Cross-Border Mediation: A New Solution for Interna-
tional Commercial Dispute Settlement?, 26 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 38, 40 (2013).
8. Id.;Mediation: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.
F
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ing their own agreement.9 Second, there is “evaluative” media-
tion where the mediator takes a slightly more active rule by
creating a non-binding evaluation of the dispute.10 Consistent
with the voluntary nature of the process, the parties are free to
accept or reject the mediator’s assessment as the settlement of
the dispute.11 Third, there is “directive” mediation, where the
mediator will actively persuade the parties to accept his or her
settlement proposal.12 Because the parties are expected to
submit to the mediator’s settlement, the process more resem-
bles a formal adjudicative process.13 Regardless of the form of
mediation, it should be emphasized again that it is non-binding
by nature.14 A mediation settlement agreement (MSA) there-
fore only becomes binding if the parties put the terms of the
settlement into a binding form, such as a contract.15
Enforcing an international MSA, previously a potentially ar-
duous process, will be made much easier because of the United
Nation’s Convention on International Mediated Settlement
Agreements Resulting from Mediation (Singapore Convention
on Mediation or Convention).16 This Note argues that the Sin-
gapore Convention on Mediation is an extremely effective,
though short of perfect, means to enforce commercial mediation
on the international level. Part I of this Note will provide a
background on the current state of international commercial
mediation and the difficulties in enforcing international MSAs.
With these challenges as context, this Part will also discuss the
advent of the Singapore Convention on Mediation and what it
purports to do. Part II will compare the Singapore Convention
to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention). Although the
two bodies of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) are arguably
conflated and often erroneously related to one another, it is dif-
ficult to discuss mediation without also mentioning arbitration.
The comparison between the two forms of ADR and their re-
9. Gaultier, supra note 7, at 39–40.
10. Id. at 40;Mediation: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.
11. Gaultier, supra note 7, at 38, 40; Mediation: Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, supra note 5.
12. Gaultier, supra note 7, at 38, 40.
13. Id.
14. Mediation: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.
15. Gaultier, supra note 7, at 38–39.
16. See infra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.
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spective conventions, however, will be useful in the context of
this note.
Part III will then argue that, because of the presumption of
enforceability that the Singapore Convention provides and be-
cause mediation has distinct advantages over litigation and
arbitration, mediation should be used increasingly—if not pri-
marily—to settle international commercial disputes. This sec-
tion will focus mostly on the advantages of mediation over arbi-
tration, the latter of which has enjoyed decades of success fol-
lowing the New York Convention as the most popular form of
ADR on the international stage. After the strengths of weak-
nesses of arbitration and mediation are discussed, this section
will briefly explore the efficacy of combining these forms of
ADR through the processes of Med-Arb and Arb-Med. Finally,
this Note will then turn to the Convention’s weaknesses. This
section will also advocate for an amendment to remedy one of
the Singapore Convention’s most notable deficiencies: that it
does not provide for enforcement of agreements to mediate.
Whether or not this change is brought about, this Note will
make the case that, overall, the Singapore Convention on Me-
diation should bring about a better future for the use of media-
tion in settling international commercial disputes.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIALMSAS PRIOR AND LEADING TO THE SINGAPORE
CONVENTION ONMEDIATION
This section will briefly discuss the mechanisms used to en-
force international commercial MSAs outside of the Singapore
Convention on Mediation. After exploring the inadequacies of
enforcing MSAs without the Convention, this Part will then
turn to the advent of the Convention. It will explain key parts
of the Convention, including when it applies, how it enforces
MSAs, and the limited defenses it provides to prevent enforce-
ment.
A. Contract Law and Other Procedures
Even with a binding contract, enforcing international dis-
putes through mediation can be a complicated process.17 There
17. See generally Brette L. Steele, Enforcing International Commercial
Mediation Agreements as Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention,
54 UCLAL. REV. 1385 (2007).
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is no universal manner for nations to enforce MSAs.18 The de-
fault method, relied upon by most nations, is litigating a con-
tract law claim.19 For example, a wronged party may initiate a
claim for breach of contract.20 To do so, “a claim will have to be
brought against the non-conforming party on the basis of the
mediated agreement, i.e. a contract, and in accordance with the
dispute resolution mechanism set out in the mediated agree-
ment.”21 Resolving a contractual dispute through mediation is
not ideal, however, because “a contract is what the parties
started out with, and litigating a contract again in another pos-
ture was not what the parties contemplated when they entered
into the mediation.”22
Some nations have special judicial procedures for enforcing
conditions of mediation, such as consent decrees in the United
States, and stipulation and judicial notarization for enforce-
ment in Bermuda and India.23 It has also become increasingly
common for countries to facilitate the enforcement of MSAs
through the context of arbitration.24 Under the Arbitration and
Conciliation Ordinance of India, for example, a valid settlement
agreement signed by the parties has “the same status and ef-
fect as if it were an arbitral award rendered by an arbitral tri-
bunal.”25
Given the lack of international harmonization however, the
need for an enforcement mechanism of international commer-
cial mediation is very well-recognized.26 The International Bar
Association’s Mediation Committee summarized the results of
2006 survey on mediation by noting that “‘[t]he enforceability
of a settlement agreement is generally of the utmost im-
18. David Weiss, A Pathway to Enforcement Mechanisms of International
Settlement Agreements, 70 DISP. RES. J. 25, 26 (2015); see also id.
19. Steele, supra note 17, at 1394–97; see also Edna Sussman, The New
York Convention through a Mediation Prism, 15 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 10, 10
(2009).
20. Steele, supra note 17, at 1388.
21. Yvonne Foo, Singapore Convention on Mediation 2019: Embarking on
a new era in alternative dispute resolution, CLYDE & CO (Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.clydeco.com/en/insights/2019/08/singapore-convention-on-
mediation-2019-embarking-o.
22. Sussman, supra note 19, at 10.
23. Steele, supra note 17, at 1388.
24. Id. at 1389–90.
25. Weiss, supra note 18, at 28.
26. See Sussman, supra note 19, at 10.
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portance’ and ‘in international mediation . . . reinforcement is
more likely to be sought because of the potential of expensive
and difficult cross-border litigation in the event of a failure to
implement a settlement.’”27
B. UNCITRAL
In order to tackle the inconsistencies and inadequacies in the
enforcement mechanisms of international mediation, the Unit-
ed Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) attempted to develop a model law on concilia-
tion.28 The resolution was drafted with mediation in mind:
“[r]ecognizing the value for international trade of methods for
settling commercial disputes in which the parties in dispute
request a third person or persons to assist them in their at-
tempt to settle the dispute amicably . . . .”29 To meet this need,
Article 14 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Conciliation reads:
“[i]f the parties conclude an agreement settling a dispute, that
settlement agreement is binding and enforceable . . . [the enact-
ing State may insert a description of the method of enforcing
settlement agreements or refer to provisions governing such en-
forcement].”30 In drafting this broad language, UNCITRAL was
concerned with the “diversity of approaches” that countries
used in enforcing mediation settlements and thus “searched for
the lowest common denominator.”31 Their work proved unsuc-
cessful, however, and the drafters eventually abandoned their
initial efforts, leaving the development of enforcement proce-
dures to the individual adopting countries.32
C. Transition to the Singapore Convention on Mediation
Given the inadequacies of the UNCITRAL model law on con-
ciliation, UNCITRAL formed Working Group II at its 49th ses-
27. Sussman, supra note 19, at 10.
28. Steele, supra note 17, at 1390. The UNCITRAL is the UN body tasked
with harmonizing and modernizing international trade law. G.A. Res. 2205
(XXI), at 99–100 (Dec. 17, 1966). This organization was established by the
General Assembly in 1966 through Resolution 2205(XXI). Id.
29. G.A. Res. 57/18, at 1, Model Law on International Commercial Concili-
ation of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (Jan.
24, 2003).
30. Id. at 7 (second alteration in original).
31. Steele, supra note 17, at 1390; see id.
32. Steele, supra note 17, at 1390.
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sion.33 The Working Group was specifically mandated to ad-
dress the enforcement of settlement agreements.34 Working
Group II, at its 63rd and 64th sessions in Vienna, thus crafted
an instrument that could provide enforcement for international
commercial settlement agreements resulting from mediation
and produced what ultimately became the Singapore Conven-
tion on Mediation.35
On August 7, 2019, a total of forty-six countries met and
signed the Singapore Convention.36 The goal of the Convention
was to facilitate the cross-border enforcement of international
MSAs, facilitate international trade, and promote mediation as
an effective form of ADR.37 The Singapore Convention’s signa-
tories include some massive economic powers, including the
United States, China, India, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Iran
and Singapore.38 On the other hand, there are notable absenc-
es, such as Japan, Brazil, Canada, Russia, Mexico, and the en-
tirety of the European Union.39 The Singapore Convention on
Mediation entered into force on September 12, 2020.40
33. See Piotr Wójtowicz & Franco Gevaerd, A New Global ADR Star is
Born: The Singapore Convention on Mediation, 37 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST
LITIG. 141, 141 (2019).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Nadja Alexander, It’s DONE: The Singapore Convention on Mediation,
WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER MEDIATION BLOG (Aug. 9, 2019), http://
mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/08/09/its-done-the-singapore-
convention-on-mediation/.
37. United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements
Resulting from Mediation (New York, 2018) (the “Singapore Convention on
Mediation”), U.N. COMM’N INT’L TRADE L.,
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/mediation/conventions/international_settleme
nt_agreements (last visited July 6, 2020).
38. Alexander, supra note 36; GDP (current US$), WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd?most_recent_value_desc
=true&view=map (last visited July 7, 2020).
39. Alexander, supra note 36; GDP (current US$), supra note 38.
40. Status of United Nations Convention on International Settlement
Agreements Resulting from
Mediation, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION., https://
treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXII-
4&chapter=22&clang=_en (last visited July 10, 2020). The first three nations
to ratify, accept, or approve the treaty were Fiji, Qatar, and Singapore. Id.
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D. Overview of the Singapore Convention on Mediation
The Singapore Convention is best viewed as a solution to the
main barrier that hampered the use of mediation in settling
international disputes: “if a party to a mediated settlement
agreement defaults on its obligations, the non-defaulting party
must turn to litigation, arbitration, or any other method con-
templated by the settlement agreement to enforce the agree-
ment like it would any other contractual obligation.”41 The
Convention ensures that when a party to an MSA is located
within a country party to the Convention, it can rely on that
MSA to prove that the dispute has already been resolved.42 To
meet these ends, the Convention begins by defining “media-
tion” as
a process, irrespective of the expression used or the ba-
sis upon which the process is carried out, whereby par-
ties attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their
dispute with the assistance of a third person or persons
(‘the mediator’) lacking the authority to impose a solu-
tion upon the parties to the dispute.43
Within this broadly applicable definition, the Convention ap-
plies to international MSAs resulting from mediation and con-
cluded in writing.44 A settlement agreement is “international” if
either:
(a) At least two parties to the settlement agreement
have their places of business in different States; or
(b) The State in which the parties to the settlement
agreement have their places of business is different
from either:
(i) The State in which a substantial part of the obliga-
tions under the settlement agreement is performed; or
41. The Singapore Convention on Mediation and the Path Ahead, GIBSON
DUNN (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.gibsondunn.com/singapore-convention-on-
mediation-and-the-path-ahead/.
42. Yvonne Foo, supra note 21.
43. G.A. Res. 73/198, United Nations Convention on International Settle-
ment Agreements Resulting from Mediation (Dec. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Sin-
gapore Convention on Mediation].
44. United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements
Resulting from Mediation (New York, 2018) (the “Singapore Convention on
Mediation”), supra note 37.
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(ii) The State with which the subject matter of the set-
tlement agreement is most closely connected.45
Even when international in scope, however, the Convention
does not apply to settlement agreements relating to family or
employment law, settlements enforceable as a judgment in a
court, and settlements enforceable as an arbitral award.46
The Singapore Convention on Mediation also uses strong,
clear language in Article 3, its enforcement mechanism.47 Arti-
cle 3 states that, if the agreement is international and settled
with mediation, parties to the Convention “shall enforce a set-
tlement agreement in accordance with [their] rules of proce-
dure and under the conditions laid down in the Convention.”48
Following this language of mandatory enforcement, Article 5
lays out several limited and specific grounds for refusal to
grant relief.49 Articles 5(1)(a) through 5(1)(d) provide for con-
tract-like defenses.50 Article 5(1)(e) and (f) are used for defenses
45. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 1.
46. The Singapore Convention on Mediation: Doing for Mediation What the
New York Convention has Done for Arbitration?, ASHURST: DISPUTE
RESOLUTION UPDATE (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-
insights/legal-updates/the-singapore-convention-on-mediation/.
47. See Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 3 (empha-
sis added).
48. Id. Likewise, Article III of the New York Convention reads that each
party “shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accord-
ance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied
upon, under the conditions laid down” in the Convention. United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
art. III, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
49. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 5. Article 5
must be invoked in order to apply. Id. Specifically, “[t]he competent authority
of the Party to the Convention where relief is sought under article 4 may re-
fuse to grant relief at the request of the party against whom the relief is
sought only if that party furnishes to the competent authority proof that” one
of the defenses outlined in Article 5 apply. Id.
50. Id.; Shou Y. Chong & Nadja Alexander, An Implied Ground for Refusal
to Enforce iMSAs Under the Singapore Convention on Mediation: the Effect of
Article 6, WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER MEDIATION BLOG (Feb. 17, 2019),
http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/02/17/an-implied-ground-
for-refusal-to-enforce-imsas-under-the-singapore-convention-on-mediation-
the-effect-of-article-6/. Article 5(1)(a) provides for a defense if “[a] party to the
settlement agreement was under some incapacity” (emphasis added). Singa-
pore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 5. Article 5(1)(b) provides
for several defenses, including if the agreement is “null and void, inoperative
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from mediator misconduct.51 Article 5(2)(a) gives a “[p]ublic pol-
icy” defense and, lastly, Article 5(2)(b) provides a defense to
“[s]ubject matter not capable of settlement by mediation.”52
Although not an express defense, Article 6 allows for a compe-
tent authority, whether a court or an arbitral tribunal, to adju-
dicate the claim if there is a parallel application or claim.53
II. THE STRENGTHS OF THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION ON
MEDIATION AND THE NEWYORK CONVENTIONMIRROR
The Singapore Convention on Mediation looks to be for medi-
ation what the New York Convention was for arbitration: a
boon.54 It should, however, be noted that the success of the New
York Convention did not happen overnight. Only forty-five na-
tions were present at the Conference that established what
would become the New York Convention.55 When the New York
Convention was finalized in 1958, there were only twenty-eight
initial signatory nations.56 Of those twenty-eight nations, only
fifteen actually ratified the convention within ten years of sign-
ing.57 It took until 1970 and 1975, respectively, for the United
or incapable of being performed under the law to which the parties have val-
idly subjected it,” is not a binding or final contract, or if it has been modified.
Id. The defense in Article 5(1)(c) applies if the obligations required by the
settlement agreement were either unclear or were not performed. Id. Lastly,
Article 5(1)(d) provides for a ground to refuse enforcement where “[g]ranting
relief would be contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement.” Id.
51. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 5; Chong &
Alexander, supra note 50.
52. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 5; Chong &
Alexander, supra note 50.
53. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 6; Chong &
Alexander, supra note 50.
54. See, e.g., Stavros Brekoulakis, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards: Observations on the Efficiency of the Current System and the Gradu-
al Development of Alternative Means of Enforcement, 19 AM. R. INT’L ARB.
415, 416 (2008).
55. Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Na-
tions Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 70 YALE L. J. 1049, 1059–60 (1961).
56. New York Convention, Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (last visited July 10, 2019).
57. Id. That being said, a total of 33 nations had ratified the New York
Convention by 1968. Id. Thus, although a signatory to a convention will not
necessarily ratify it in the near future, this fact also shows that the amount
of countries that ratify a convention can quickly surpass the initial number of
signatories.
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States and the United Kingdom to sign on to the New York
Convention.58 The New York Convention has, nonetheless,
grown substantially over time.59 By the end of 1986, sixty-eight
countries had ratified the Convention.60 Today that number
has ballooned to 161, consisting of a majority of the world and
all of the largest economies.61
A. Overview of the New York Convention
Before discussing why exactly a great majority of the world
has decided to ratify the New York Convention and discussing
its similarities to the Singapore Convention on Mediation, it is
worth noting briefly what exactly the New York Convention
provides, to what it applies, and what its intended goals were.
The New Convention concerns arbitration, a private adjudica-
tory system designed and organized through contracts.62 The
key distinction separating arbitration from mediation is that
the neutral third party, the arbitrator, has the authority to
58. May Lu, Note, The New York Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Analysis of the Seven Defenses to Op-
pose Enforcement in the United States and England, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L L. 747,
748, 753 (2006); Once ratified, The New York Convention was implemented
in the United States through the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and in the
United Kingdom through the 1975 U.K. Arbitration Act. Louis Del Duca &
Nancy A. Welsh, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Agreements and Awards:
Application of the New York Convention in the United States, 62 AM. J. COMP.
L. SUPP. 69, 70 (2014). See also Lu, supra note 58, at 753. The US originally
chose not to become a signatory out of concerns that it would require substan-
tial changes and developments in state and federal law. See Duca & Welsh,
supra note 58 at 70; see also Lu, supra note 58, at 751. The United States’
position ultimately changed with the rise of international commerce and the
costs in litigating international disputes. Duca & Welsh, supra note 58 at 70.
The United States’ absence from the convention is an important fact because
English is now the main language of used to conduct international commer-
cial transactions. Lu, supra note 58, at 748.
59. See New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 56.
60. Id.
61. GDP (current US$), supra note 38; New York Arbitration Convention,
supra note 56.
62. See Robert Bird, Enforcement of Annulled Arbitration Awards: A Com-
pany Perspective and an Evaluation of a New York Convention, 7 N.C. J.
INT’L. L. & COM. REG.1013, 1014 (2012); see also Edna Sussman, Why Arbi-
trate? The Benefits and Savings, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. (Oct. 2009). Arbitration
is extremely flexible, as it allows parties to choose things such as the institu-
tion, who the arbitrators will be, the number of arbitrators, the extent of dis-
covery, and more. Sussman, supra note 62, at 22–24.
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grant an award.63 An award by itself, however, is useless; it
must be taken to a court to be enforced.64 Due to difficulties en-
forcing awards between parties from two different countries,
the UN convened the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses
in 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Arbi-
tral Awards in 1927.65 Soon after WWII and at the request of
the International Chamber of Commerce, the UN’s Economic
and Social Council again convened a conference with repre-
sentatives of forty-five nations “to consider . . . measures for
increasing the effectiveness of arbitration in the settlement of
private law disputes.”66 The Council drafted and ultimately
adopted what would become known as the New York Conven-
tion.67
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of the United
States succinctly articulated that the goal of the New York
Convention “was to encourage the recognition and enforcement
of commercial arbitration agreements in international con-
tracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbi-
trate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the sig-
natory countries.”68 In more detail, UNCITRAL stated that the
63. Arbitration, A.B.A.: DISP. RESOL. PROCESSES,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeRes
olutionProcesses/arbitration/ (last visited July 10, 2020).
64. See Sally-Ann Underhill & M. C. Cárdenas, Awards: Early Stage Con-
sideration of Enforcement Issues, THE GUIDE TO CHALLENGING AND ENFORCING
ARB. AWARDS 7 (J. William Rowley QC et. al eds., 2019).
65. See generally Quigley, supra note 55 at 1054–56,1059; History 1923 –
1958, N.Y. Arb. Convention, http://
www.newyorkconvention.org/travaux+preparatoires/history+1923+-+1958
(last visited July 10, 2020).
66. Quigley, supra note 55, at 1059.
67. History 1923 – 1958, supra note 65.
68. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974). Scherk
involved a dispute between Alberto-Culver Co., an American company, and
Scherk, a German citizen who owned several German and Lichtenstein busi-
nesses. Id. at 508. Scherk and Alberto-Culver formed a contract whereby
Scheck would transfer ownership and trademark rights of his enterprises to
Alberto-Culver. Id. The contract contained an arbitration clause specifying
that the place of arbitration would be the International Chamber of Com-
merce in Paris but governed by the laws of the United States. Id. Alberto-
Culver eventually rescinded the contract and commenced an action in the
Federal District of Court in Illinois, alleging fraudulent representation under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 509. The District Court, relying on
Wilko v. Swan 346 U.S. 427 (1953), the previous guiding Supreme Court deci-
sion on the enforceability of arbitration clauses, granted a preliminary order
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objective of the New York Convention was to ensure “that for-
eign and non-domestic arbitral awards will not be discriminat-
ed against and it obliges Parties to ensure such awards are rec-
ognized and generally capable of enforcement in their jurisdic-
tion in the same way as domestic awards.”69 Beyond the assur-
ance of enforceability, it also directs “[p]arties to give full effect
to arbitration agreements by requiring courts to deny the par-
ties access to court in contravention of their agreement to refer
the matter to an arbitral tribunal.”70
The New York Convention achieves these goals through very
simple language. Article I sets out the scope of the conven-
tion,71 but Article II provides that arbitral awards are pre-
sumptively valid and enforceable:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writ-
ing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitra-
tion all or any differences which have arisen or which may
arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capa-
ble of settlement by arbitration.72
Article II(3) further provides the actual enforcement mecha-
nism:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a
matter in respect of which the parties have made an agree-
ment within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request
of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it
enjoining Scherk from proceeding with arbitration. Id. at 509–10. In Wilko,
the Court held that an “agreement to arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of
a security from seeking a judicial remedy under the Securities Act of 1933.”
Id. at 510. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s ruling. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court and
held that “the agreement of the parties in this case to arbitrate any dispute
arising out of their international commercial transaction is to be respected
and enforced by the federal courts in accord with the explicit provisions of the
Arbitration Act.” Id. at 519–20 (1974).
69. New York Convention, supra note 48.
70. Id.
71. Id. art. I
72. Id. art. II; Gary B. Born, The New York Convention: A Self-Executing
Treaty, 40 MICH. J. OF INT’L. LAW 115, 120 (2018).
2020] A Brave New World for Int'l Mediation 195
finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed.73
This provision is especially important because it “ensures
that international arbitration agreements will . . . be promptly
and efficiently enforced in accordance with their terms by re-
quiring the parties to arbitrate, rather than litigate, their un-
derlying dispute.”74
The crucial objective of the New York Convention of “encour-
ag[ing] recognition and enforcement of awards in the greatest
number of cases as possible” is achieved through Article VII of
the convention.75 Article VII(1) states:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the
validity of multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards entered into
by the Contracting States nor deprive any interested party of
any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in
the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the trea-
ties of the country where such award is sought to be relied
upon.76
This section recognizes “the right of any interested party to
avail itself of law or treaties of the country where the award is
sought to be relied upon, including where such law or treaties
offer a regime more [favorable] than the Convention.”77 This
provision is commonly known as the “most-favorable-right”
provision because it allows domestic law to supersede the New
York Convention where the domestic law would allow for a
more favorable procedure for enforcement.78
B. The New York Convention’s Most Notable Weaknesses
This is not to say that the New York Convention is not with-
out any weakness and that the Singapore Convention on Medi-
ation will be immune from similar flaws.79 Ironically, the New
73. New York Convention, supra note 48, art. II; Born, supra note 72, at
120.
74. Born, supra note 72, at 120.
75. New York Convention, supra note 48, art. VII.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Georgios C. Petrochilos, Enforcing Awards Annulled in Their State of
Origin under the New York Convention, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 856, 861, 874
(1999).
79. See generally Brekoulakis, supra note 54.
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York Convention’s most notable weaknesses have to do with
the enforcement of arbitral awards, the very thing it was de-
signed to improve.80 Enforcing awards can be costly and adver-
sarial, and thus unfriendly to businesses.81 Because enforcing
awards is difficult even under the New York Convention, many
parties will choose to settle after the award has been granted,
rather than seeking a court to enforce the award.82 This weak-
ness nonetheless results largely from the fact that it is the ob-
ligation of domestic legislation to create a system for the en-
forcement of arbitral awards.83
C. The New York Convention and Singapore Convention Mirror
There is much overlap between the goals of the Singapore
Convention on Mediation and the New York Convention.84 The
similarities between these two conventions, accordingly, might
be a result of the recognition articulated by the Chair of The
Corporate Counsel International Arbitration Group during the
UNCITRAL Working Group II meeting in 2015:
One of the greatest challenges we face commercially is con-
vincing companies in many parts of the world to agree to me-
diation in the first place [because] it does not have the kind of
international recognition and legitimacy that the NY Conven-
tion has so successfully given to international arbitration.85
With this challenge in mind, put simply in a note by the UN
Secretariat, the Singapore Convention on Mediation was de-
signed to “[ensure] that a settlement reached by parties be-
comes binding and enforceable in accordance with a simplified
80. Brekoulakis, supra note 54, at 437–48.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 419–22.
83. Id. at 437.
84. See Iris Ng, The Singapore Mediation Convention: What Does it Mean
for Arbitration and the Future of Dispute Resolution?, WOLTERS KLUWER:
KLUEWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Aug. 31, 2019), http://
arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/08/31/the-singapore-mediation-
convention-what-does-it-mean-for-arbitration-and-the-future-of-dispute-
resolution/; Sreenivasan Narayanan S.C. & Wei Liang Jason Lim, The Sin-
gapore Convention on Mediation: A Primer, K&L GATES (July 25, 2019),
http://www.klgates.com/the-singapore-convention-on-mediation-a-
primer/?nomobile=perm.
85. Weiss, supra note 18, at 30.
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and streamlined procedure.”86 The Singapore Convention on
Mediation was additionally intended to increase predictability
and greater respect when using binding MSAs.87 Thus, as out-
lined above, both the Singapore Convention on Mediation and
the New York Convention are concerned primarily with the en-
forceability of awards granted by their respective forms of ADR.
Perhaps due to the success enjoyed by the New York Conven-
tion, the Singapore Convention on Mediation borrows much of
its language and structure from the New York Convention.88
For example, the third article of both conventions require that
“[e]ach party to the convention” or “[e]ach [c]ontracting [s]tate”
shall enforce settlement agreements or arbitral awards in ac-
cordance with the procedure of the territory where enforcement
of the award is sought and under the conditions of the conven-
tions, respectively.89 Further, Article V of the New York Con-
vention and Article 5 of the Singapore Convention both provide
for defenses—grounds for refusing to grant relief.90 Both Article
86. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Settlement of Com-
mercial Disputes International Commercial Mediation: Draft UNCITRAL
Notes on Mediation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/987, at 4 (2019).
87. Singapore Convention on Mediation, Building Trust, Enabling Interna-
tional Trade, SINGAPORE CONVENTION,
http://digiwebmm.com/staging/SGConvention/assets/pdf/statements/SCMRou
ndtableChairsStatementFinal.pdf (last visited Sep. 19, 2020).
88. UNCITRAL, Planned and possible future work — Part III Proposal by
the Government of the United States of America: future work for Working
Group II, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/822, at 3 (2014) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/822]; see generally Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note
43, art. 3; New York Convention, supra note 48. It should be stated again
that it is far from a coincidence that the New York Convention and Singapore
Convention on Mediation share goals about enforceability and thus much of
their language. The United States specifically proposed that the UNCITRAL
Working Group II form a
multilateral convention on the enforceability of international commercial
settlement agreements reached through conciliation, with the goal of encour-
aging conciliation in the same way that the New York Convention facilitated
the growth of arbitration. Just as the New York Convention has been success-
ful in part due to its relative brevity and simplicity, an analogous convention
on conciliation should also avoid unnecessary complexity.
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/822, supra note 88.
89. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 3; New York
Convention, supra note 48, art. III.
90. Eunice Chua, The Singapore Convention on Mediation - A Brighter
Future for Asian Dispute Resolution, 9 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 195, 200–02 (2019);
Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 5; New York Conven-
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VI and Article 6 of the respective conventions address parallel
applications or claims and if a “competent authority” has set
aside of suspended the award.91 These articles are particularly
important because they balance the countervailing concerns of
enhancing the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards against
the need for judicial oversight thereof.92 Finally, like the New
York Convention, the Singapore Convention on Mediation also
requires domestic implementation of the treaty.93
III. THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION ONMEDIATION AND THE PATH
FORWARD FOR THE INCREASED USE OFMEDIATION ALONGSIDE
OR IN PLACE OF ARBITRATION
With the Singapore Convention on Mediation contextualized
and its relationship to the New York Convention explained, it
is worth now exploring the efficacy of mediation and arbitra-
tion. Each form of ADR has its own strengths and weaknesses,
tion, supra note 48, art. V. Some of the language differences between the de-
fenses in Article 5 of both conventions is merely out of a necessity to suit the
context of mediation or arbitration. For instance, Article 5(1)(a) to (c) of the
Singapore Convention on Mediation, which provides a defense for incapacity
to enter into an agreement, “as well as when an arbitral award has not yet
become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended” are ex-
tremely similar to Article V(1)(a) and (e) of the New York Convention. Singa-
pore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 5; New York Convention,
supra note 48, art. V. Additionally, Article 5(2) of the Singapore Convention
is essentially a mirror of Article V(2) of the New York Convention, “which
allows refusal of enforcement if the ‘subject matter of the difference is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of [the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought]’ and where recognition or enforcement
‘would be contrary to the public policy of that country’.” Singapore Conven-
tion on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 5; New York Convention, supra note
48, art. V. The only major difference in the defenses between the two conven-
tions is in Article 5(1)(d) of the Singapore Convention on Mediation. Compare
Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 5 with New York
Convention, supra note 48, art. V Although Article 5 is not directly based on a
defense from the New York Convention, “that is only because it is unique to
the mediation context, where a mediation agreement could possibly preclude
or limit enforceability as one of its terms.” The Singapore Convention on Me-
diation—A Brighter Future for Asian Dispute Resolution.
91. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 6; New York
Convention, supra note 48, art. VI.
92. Emmanuel Gaillard & Benjamin Siino, Enforcement under the
NewYork Convention, THE GUIDE TO CHALLENGING AND ENFORCING ARB.
AWARDS 96 (J. William Rowley QC et. al eds., 2019).
93. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 1.
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regardless of the mechanism used to enforce arbitral awards or
MSAs. In an attempt to minimize the flaws and maximize the
benefits of mediation and arbitration, some parties use hybrid
types of ADR that combine the two mechanisms. Med-Arb, Arb-
Med, and Arb-Med-Arb, as their names suggest, allow parties
to first conduct a mediation or arbitration and, depending on
the circumstances, then switch to the other.
In addition to the weaknesses inherent to mediation, the Sin-
gapore Convention on Mediation has its own unique flaws. De-
spite its many similarities to the New York Convention, the
Singapore Convention on Mediation does not mirror the New
York Convention closely enough. In particular, this Note ar-
gues that the Singapore Convention on Mediation should en-
force both MSAs and agreements to mediate, similar to how the
New York Convention enforces both arbitral awards and
agreements to arbitrate.
A. Strengths and Weaknesses of Arbitration in Resolving Inter-
national Commercial Disputes
To be sure, arbitration has some distinct advantages over
mediation in resolving international commercial disputes.
While mediation might have more of a reputation for voluntar-
iness, arbitration too requires parties to consent to submit to
an arbitration clause within an enforceable contract.94 Typical
contract defenses against unfairness or lack of voluntariness,
such as duress and unconscionability, accordingly apply.95
Perhaps the most notable and powerful advantage that arbi-
tration has is that the decision rendered is final.96 Although
arbitral awards must be enforced and turned into a judgment
by a court in whatever jurisdiction the winning party wishes to
collect, under the New York Convention, arbitral awards are
binding.97 This efficiency has the additional benefit of avoiding
the potential bias parties might face litigating in a foreign
94. See Peter B. Rutledge, Convergence and Divergence in International
Dispute Resolution, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 49, 50 (2012). If the hallmark of me-
diation is voluntariness, the hallmark of arbitration might be called consent.
Id.
95. New York Convention, supra note 48, art. V.
96. See William Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 805, 808 (1999).
97. New York Convention, supra note 48, art. III.
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court.98 This finality does, however, come at the cost of depriv-
ing the loser of strong procedural safeguards.99
These advantages notwithstanding, arbitration shares many
similarities with litigation.100 In fact, some critics argue that
arbitration has essentially become indistinguishable from liti-
gation.101 In contrast to its intended function as a faster and
more flexible alternative to litigation,102 arbitration has even
been called “the new litigation.”103 In arbitration, parties can
choose their adjudicator—and thus find an extremely compe-
tent finder of fact—all while avoiding the costs of standard liti-
gation that include: depositions, interrogatories, general dis-
covery exchange, and the delays that come with litigation and
working with the courts.104 These costs, usually associated with
litigation, are becoming increasingly common in arbitration be-
cause of the “Americanization” of international arbitration.105
The Honorable John L. Kane of the American Bar Association
highlighted just how far arbitration’s advantages have fallen in
comparison to litigation:
Many arbitrations now last as long as or longer than compa-
rable court cases. They are frequently as expensive as, if not
more expensive than, litigation because the arbitrators and
facilities are paid for by the parties rather than provided at
public expense. While there are no guaranties of quality relat-
ing to any decision, whether obtained through arbitration or
the courts, the absence of appellate review of arbitral awards
leaves errors in reasoning unaddressed.106
Arbitration, moreover, can heavily favor the more powerful
party—just like in conventional litigation.107 The more re-
source-rich party can secure better representation, which can
in turn lead to the obtaining of better supporting substantive
98. William Park, supra note 96, at 808.
99. See id. at 808, 816–17.
100. See generally Rutledge, supra note 94, at 52–58; Hon. John L. Kane,
Sua Sponte: A Judge Comments, 37 LITIG. 33, 34 (2011).
101. See Rutledge, supra note 94, at 49.
102. Kane, supra note 100, at 33.
103. Sussman, supra note 19, at 10.
104. Id.
105. Sussman, supra note 19, at 10.
106. Kane, supra note 100, at 35.
107. Jean Strenlight, Dispute Resolution and the Quest for Justice, 19
EXPERIENCE 14, 15–16 (2009).
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law or finding a more favorable arbitrator, thus increasing the
likelihood that the arbitrator will rule in their favor.108 The
party with more resources is also better suited to withstand a
prolonged dispute, potentially forcing concessions or an out-
right victory.109 The advantages begin before a dispute even
arises, as the stronger party can draft and negotiate a more fa-
vorable arbitration clause.110 Finally, because parties must pay
their arbitrator, an arbitrator may be more likely to favor the
wealthier party out of a fear of losing future business.111
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of Mediation in Resolving Inter-
national Commercial Disputes
Mediation, like arbitration, is also subject to some well-
recognized weaknesses, most notably its lack of enforceabil-
ity.112 The Singapore Convention on Mediation, however, large-
ly remedies this concern in the international context. Media-
tion nevertheless has its own costs, and it requires time, prepa-
ration, and money from the participating parties.113 Because
mediation is voluntary in nature, there is nothing guaranteeing
a final agreement, regardless of input costs.114 If the parties
thus cannot reach a settlement agreement, all of this invest-
ment will be wasted.115
108. Id. at 16.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Jessica Selver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privat-
ization of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-
privatization-of-the-justice-system.html. This issue, however contrary to the
notion of neutrality it may be, is an unfortunate reality. See id. For instance,
“in interviews with The Times, more than three dozen arbitrators described
how they felt beholden to companies. Beneath every decision, the arbitrators
said, was the threat of losing business.” Id.
112. See, e.g., Wójtowicz & Gevaerd, supra note 33 at 141; Sussman, supra
note 19, at 10.
113. Sussman, supra note 19, at 10.
114. Bruce Love, New UN Singapore Convention drives shift to mediation of
trade disputes, FINANCIAL TIMES: SPECIAL REPORT INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION
(Aug. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/6e1df030-9e6f-11e9-9c06-
a4640c9feebb.
115. Sussman, supra note 19, at 10.
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Just as in arbitration and litigation, an asymmetry of power
can also affect the outcome of mediation.116 A distinct power
disparity between parties may increase the stronger party’s
view of the mediator as a roadblock towards achieving a total
victory, rather than a means to reach a mutually beneficial
compromise.117 That party may therefore be unwilling to accept
mediation in the first place, or, if it is accepted, be less likely to
make concessions or compromise—elements necessary to a suc-
cessful mediation.118 It has also been shown that the stronger
party can use the mediator merely to facilitate the surrender of
the weaker party.119
Despite the strengths of arbitration, mediation has certain
advantages that make it a better long-term solution in resolv-
ing disputes between parties.120 Most notably, mediation is
more effective than arbitration or litigation at maintaining re-
lationships between parties.121 Where “the maintenance of rela-
tionships or harmony between the parties is particularly im-
portant” or “where the disputants have, or desire to have, con-
tinuing business relationships[,] a procedure and resolution
which does not unduly impair the relationship is particularly
valuable.”122 Arbitration is not effective at meeting this end be-
cause it is, like litigation, adversarial in nature.123 In arbitra-
tion, moreover, a decision can be forced upon the parties by an
arbitrator without concession having ever been reached.124 In
mediation, by contrast, the parties involved must voluntarily
agree to the resolution.125 The voluntary nature of mediation is
precisely what preserves business relationships: both parties
have to come to an agreement through consensus.126 Media-
116. See Marieke Kleiboer, Understanding Success and Failure of Interna-
tional Mediation, 40 THE J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 360, 368 (1996); Strenlight,
supra note 107, at 15.
117. Kleiboer, supra note 116, at 368.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. E.g. Love, supra note 114; Michael Pryles, Assessing Dispute Resolu-
tion Procedures, 7 AM. REV. INTL. ARB. 267, 273 (1996).
121. E.g. Love, supra note 114; Pryles, supra note 120 at 273.
122. Pryles, supra note 120 at 273.
123. Sussman, supra note 19, at 10; see generally Strenlight, supra note
107; Rutledge, supra note 94.
124. Love, supra note 114.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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tion’s focus “on the accommodation of interests can result in a
‘win/win’ result” and thus also further foster relationships be-
tween parties.127
The benefits of a conciliatory process are not necessarily at
the expense of time or flexibility.128 Rather, mediation settle-
ments can also be more creative than results of arbitration or
litigation.129 Mediation is also a much quicker process than ar-
bitration and can even be completed within a day.130 Because
the process takes less time to prepare for and conduct, if par-
ties are able to form an agreement, it can also be significantly
cheaper than arbitration, even if there are sunk costs from an
unfavorable deal or the failure to come to one altogether.131
C. Med-Arb and Arb-Med as a Best-of-Both-Worlds and Addi-
tional Avenues for Resolving Disputes
As stated above, both mediation and arbitration have unique
advantages when settling international disputes. Parties need
not, however, decide on only one or the other; in fact, there are
ways to combine the two forms of ADR, often while retaining
the strengths and minimizing the weaknesses of each.132
1. Med-Arb
Med-Arb is a hybrid mechanism in which the parties first at-
tempt to reach a voluntary agreement through neutral third-
party mediation; if unsuccessful, the parties proceed to arbitra-
tion.133 The same neutral party that presides over and leads the
mediation also tends to be the arbitrator if the case does not
127. Pryles, supra note 120 at 273.
128. Id. at 278–79.
129. Id. at 278. In mediation, “an existing dispute may be resolved on a ba-
sis which includes an agreement to enter into a new commercial relation-
ship,” while litigation and arbitration “can only resolve a dispute by deter-
mining existing rights. It is no part of the function of a judge or arbitrator to
suggest or require that new rights or arrangements be created.” Id.
130. Id. at 279.
131. Id.
132. See Joshua M. Javits, Better Process, Better Results: Integrating Media-
tion and Arbitration to Resolve Collective Bargaining Disputes, 32 A.B.A. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 167, 169–70 (2017); see also Martin C. Weisman, Med-Arb:
The Best of Both Worlds, 19 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 40, 40 (2013).
133. Weisman, supra note 132, at 40.
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settle.134 This form of ADR is used most frequently in resolving
international commercial disputes.135
Med-Arb is an effective form of ADR because it first allows
parties to promptly and efficiently settle their dispute through
mediation.136 Parties are especially encouraged to settle the
dispute at the mediation stage because, if they cannot resolve
the dispute, parties will be left facing the prospect of an arbi-
tral award, which is final and virtually non-appealable.137 For
better or worse, studies have shown that “parties were sub-
stantially more motivated to settle in mediation because they
wanted to avoid the loss of control that would come in the arbi-
tration phase.”138 Med-Arb nonetheless still maintains the vol-
untary spirit of mediation as the mediation process comes first
and it is highly encouraged that the parties settle the dispute
before turning to arbitration.139 Moreover, both parties have to
subscribe to the idea of resolving their dispute through Med-
Arb by making a binding and enforceable contract.140 In this
contract, of course, the parties may choose the scope of the me-
diation and arbitration, as well as who the third party will
be.141
Med-Arb, nonetheless, has been subject to criticism.142 The
main critique of Med-Arb focuses on the fact that the same
third party will preside over the mediation and arbitration.143
During the course of mediation, it is likely that confidential in-
formation will be shared.144 This confidential information, once
divulged, might potentially alter subsequent arbitration pro-
ceedings.145 It should be reiterated, though, that mediation and
134. Javits, supra note 132, at 169.




139. See Brian Pappas, Med-Arb and the Legalization of Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 157, 172–200 (2015); Weisman, supra
note 132, at 41.
140. Javits, supra note 132, at 169.
141. Weisman, supra note 132, at 40.
142. See, e.g., Julie Brienza, Adr: Doing Two Things at Once Can Be Prob-
lematic, 34 TR. 94 (1998); Weisman, supra note 132, at 42.
143. See, e.g., Brienza, supra note 142, at 93–94; Weisman, supra note 132,
at 41.
144. Weisman, supra note 132, at 41.
145. Id.
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arbitration are both wholly private matters to the extent par-
ties wish it to be, and this confidential information does not
need to leave the room of mediation or arbitration.146 Parties
not cognizant of this fact or cautious of harming their chances
in arbitration might be less willing to share information during
mediation, which in turn may increase the challenge in creat-
ing a settlement during mediation.147 Med-Arb also faces the
same issues about enforcement that mediation currently
does.148
2. Arb-Med and Arb-Med-Arb
Similar to Med-Arb and as the name suggests, Arb-Med is a
hybrid form of ADR that combines the adjudicative approach of
arbitration with the non-adjudicative approach of mediation.149
The process works by first placing the parties into arbitra-
tion.150 Once both parties present their case, “[a]t the end of the
hearings, the arbitrator writes up a decision and seals it in an
envelope without disclosing its contents to the parties.”151 The
parties are then moved directly into mediation for a fixed peri-
od of time set either by contract or the arbitrator whereby the
parties can work on an MSA.152 Although the same neutral
third-party usually acts as both the mediator and arbitrator,
the parties can also opt to have a different mediator.153 If the
146. See Sussman, supra note 62.
147. Ellen E. Deason, Combinations of Mediation and Arbitration with the
Same Neutral: A Framework for Judicial Review, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. &MEDIATION
219, 224 (2013).
148. See Morrison Foster, Newly Signed Singapore Convention to Make In-
ternational Settlement Agreements Directly Enforceable in Convention States,
MOFO.COM: INSIGHTS (Aug. 15, 2019), https://
www.mofo.com/resources/insights/190815-newly-signed-s ingapore-
convention.html.
149. Weixia Gu, Hybrid Dispute Resolution Beyond the Belt and Road: To-
ward a New Design of Chinese Arb-Med(-Arb) and Its Global Implications, 29
Wash. Int’l L. J. 117, 118 (2019).
150. Elizabeth A. Hunt, Arb-Med: ADR in the New Millennium, 42 ORANGE
CNTY. L. 29, 29 (2000).
151. Arnold M. Zack, The Quest for Finality in Airline Disputes: A Case for
Arb-Med, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 34, 37 (2003).
152. Id.
153. Id. Parties may select different people to act as the mediator and arbi-
trator to preserve the neutrality of the third-party, the essence of both forms
of ADR. Id. Selecting different people, however, can increase the time it takes
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parties are able to come to an agreement through mediation,
the arbitrator’s decision is never revealed and is thrown out.154
If the parties cannot settle their dispute through mediation,
the arbitrator’s decision becomes final and binding on the par-
ties.155 Sometimes, the parties will be returned to arbitration in
Arb-Med cases, an event sometimes referred to as Arb-Med-
Arb.156 An arbitral award will be the final result regardless.157
Arb-Med is a valuable form of ADR because it “can ensure
that the parties continue their relationship without the rancor
inherent in a decision externally imposed . . . which disallows
the face-saving dialogue inherent in mediation.”158 Arb-Med
also promotes openness between the parties because there is
the looming threat that the arbitrator may decide the dispute
on the merits.159 As such, Arb-Med has an advantage over Med-
Arb in that “the neutral can conduct the mediation without fear
that information he learns will contaminate the arbitration
process.”160 Med-Arb nevertheless remains more popular than
Arb-Med because of the cost barriers resulting from the fact
that the parties must pay for both an arbitral hearing and me-
diation, even if they are able to settle the dispute through the
most cost-effective means of mediation.161
D. The Singapore Convention on Mediation’s Unique Weakness-
es and Potential Remedies
The Singapore Convention on Mediation’s main weaknesses
stem from its limitations on enforcement. Namely, the Conven-
tion does not support awards derived from hybrid forms of
ADR.162 The Convention also does not cover MSAs in family or
to resolve the dispute as the new third-party will have to familiarize them-
selves with the issues of the case and the parties’ positions. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Gu, supra note 149, at 122; see also Deason, supra note 147, at 222.
157. Gu, supra note 149, at 122.
158. Hunt, supra note 150, at 122.
159. See Deason, supra note 147, at 222.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 221–22
162. See, e.g., Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 1;
Rachel Chiu, Arbitration, mediation, and the Singapore Convention on Medi-
ation, THOMAS REUTERS: ARB. BLOG (Aug. 5, 2019), http://
arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/arbitration-mediation-and-the-singapore-
convention-on-mediation/.
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employment law disputes.163 Most significantly, however, the
Convention does not provide enforcement for agreements to
mediate,164 which can have detrimental ramifications for par-
ties that initially intended for their dispute to be resolved
through mediation.
1. Hybrid Dispute Resolution Procedures
One strength overlying both Med-Arb and Arb-Med is that
both forms of ADR combine the voluntary, “conciliatory nature
of mediation” with the certainty and finality of arbitration.165
The certainty of arbitration results from its presumption of en-
forceability in most of the world through the New York Con-
vention.166 However, Med-Arb is rarely used in international
disputes, most likely a result of the costs and inefficiencies of
requiring both a mediation and arbitrator.167
The Singapore Convention on Mediation, however, does not
support hybrid dispute resolution methods of mediation and
arbitration or litigation, so it does not further support Arb-Med
or Med-Arb.168 Article 1 of the Convention specifically does not
apply to “[s]ettlement agreements that have been recorded and
are enforceable as an arbitral award.”169 Thus, as valuable as
these hybrid dispute mechanisms may be to sophisticated par-
ties, the Convention will not help with perhaps their weakest
aspect: enforceability. Commercial parties who favor resolving
their disputes in a non-adversarial manner might, therefore,
opt purely for mediation170 with the additional knowledge that
their MSA will be enforceable under the Singapore Conven-
tion.171 Regardless of the prevalence of these hybrid forms of
ADR, there is still the chance that larger international busi-
nesses that contract to have these types of dispute resolution
mechanisms will be left wanting because of the lack of added
163. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 1.
164. See Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 1.
165. Chiu, supra note 162.
166. See Born, supra note 72, at 120; New York Convention, supra note 48,
art. III; New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 56.
167. Foster, supra note 148.
168. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 1.
169. Id.
170. Chiu, supra note 162.
171. See Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 3
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enforceability.172 It remains to be seen if this will hinder the
Convention’s overall success, but it is nonetheless a notable ab-
sence, and one in which contracting parties should aware.
2. Caveats and Unique Attributes to the Singapore Convention
on Mediation
The Singapore Convention on Mediation has certain caveats
not found in the New York Convention.173 Article 1 of the Sin-
gapore Convention on Mediation, for example, states that the
Convention does not apply to settlement agreements “(a) Con-
cluded to resolve a dispute arising from transactions engaged
in by one of the parties (a consumer) for personal, family or
household purposes” or “(b) Relating to family, inheritance or
employment law.”174 Mediation is very frequently used to re-
solve disputes in family law and employment law,175 thus this
exclusion leaves out a large number of potential disputes.
172. Ashutosh Ray, Is Singapore Convention to Mediation what New York




173. See Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 1; New
York Convention, supra note 48, art. I.
174. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 1.
175. See generally Roger C. Clapp, Family Law Disputes Cry Out for Medi-
ated Settlements, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 34, 34 (1998) (“mediation is a required
step in family law matters in many states”); Radoslaw Pawlowski, Alternative
Dispute Resolution for Hague Convention Child Custody Disputes, 45 FAM.
CT. REV. 302 (2007) (noting the use of ADR in resolving family law disputes
in the US, Australia, and Europe, and advocating for the use of an interna-
tional ADR process for the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna-
tional Child Abduction); Marta Requena, Activities of the Council of Europe in
the Field of Family Law, 31 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 53, 56–59 (2000) (discussing
the European Conference on Family Law, including Family Mediation Rec-
ommendation No.R (98), which provided for the use of mediation as alterna-
tives to judicial or administrative determinations); David L. Gregory, The
Internationalization of Employment Dispute Mediation, 14 N.Y. INT’L. L. REV.
2 (2001) (exploring the effectiveness of international mediation in employ-
ment disputes); Jim H. Young & Lin Zhu, Overview of China’s New Labor
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP:
INSIGHTS (2012), https://www.dwt.com/insights/2008/01/overview-of-chinas-
new-labor-dispute-mediation-and (providing an overview of the Labor Dis-
pute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China, which
includes provisions for mediation and arbitration).
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Article 5 of the Convention, which sets out defenses to en-
forcement of mediation, also provides a distinct non-contract
defense:
[t]he competent authority where relief is sought (in other
words, a national court) may refuse to grant relief on the
grounds that “there was a serious breach by the mediator of
standards applicable to the mediator or the mediation with-
out which breach that party would not have entered into the
settlement agreement.”176
While it should be noted that protecting against “a serious
breach by the mediator”177 seems like a fair defense for which
to provide, it is a nebulous and ill-defined concept. This lan-
guage further raises the potential question of whether the MSA
would have been agreed upon “but for the serious breach by the
mediator of standards applicable to the mediator or the media-
tion [and] would place in issue potentially thorny issues of fact
as to what the motivation was of the party seeking to resist en-
forcement for entering into the mediated settlement agree-
ment.”178 Here, the Convention is balancing the line between
fairness and efficiency. As the mediator lacks the adjudicatory
power of an arbitrator or judge however, the Convention is po-
tentially opening the door to unnecessary litigation in the name
of a minor risk.
Perhaps the most significant potential weakness of the Sin-
gapore Convention on Mediation is that its scope speaks only to
the enforcement of MSAs.179 The New York Convention, in con-
trast, covers both enforcement of arbitral awards and agree-
ments to arbitrate.180 The latter is especially important because
parties that agree to arbitrate can be confident that their dis-
pute will be resolved in arbitration—according to the terms of
the contract—rather than in court.181 It is now simple to say
176. Sapna Jhangiani, The Singapore Convention on Mediation – A Com-





179. See Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 1.
180. See New York Convention, supra note 48, art. I.
181. See New York Convention, supra note 48, art. III; see also First Op-
tions of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995) (holding that the
basic objective of the Federal Arbitration Act is “to ensure that commercial
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that if parties agreed to arbitrate, they should be able to settle
their dispute through arbitration.182 Unlike the New York Con-
vention, however, the Singapore Convention on Mediation does
not provide parties a guarantee that their claims will ever
make it to mediation to be resolved.183 This results from the
fact that the Singapore Convention on Mediation does not pro-
vide enforcement for agreements to mediate.184 As such, the
Convention offers no protection “if an opposing party breache[s]
the agreement to mediate. The party wishing to enforce an
agreement to mediate will have to resort to other protracted
avenues to enforce the mediation agreement, just like any oth-
er contractual agreement.”185
The lack of enforceability of agreements to mediate was not
an accident,186 but nonetheless should be considered as grounds
for an amendment to the Convention. The drafters considered,
but ultimately rejected, language that would have allowed for
the enforcement of agreements to mediate.187 Their primary
reason for exclusion was that including such a clause would
complicate and potentially hinder the drafting process.188 It is
also likely that the drafters considered this to be a less-
important issue. Indeed, evidence from US litigation might
support this notion.189 Of the US judicial opinions about a dis-
puted mediation issue, “disputes about court power to compel
mediation were just 6% of all cases in 2013–2017 . . . while dis-
putes about contractual or statutory obligations to mediate
were 9% of all cases in 2013–2017.”190 US courts will also “‘gen-
erally enforce a pre-existing obligation to participate in media-
arbitration agreements, like other contracts, ‘are enforced according to their
terms,’ . . . and according to the intentions of the parties.” Id. (quoting Mas-
trobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)).
182. Singapore Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 1.
183. Compare New York Convention, supra note 48, art. I, with Singapore
Convention on Mediation, supra note 43, art. 1.
184. Ray, supra note 172.
185. Id.
186. See James R. Coben, Evaluating the Singapore Convention Through A
U.S.-Centric Litigation Lens: Lessons Learned from Nearly Two Decades of
Mediation Disputes in American Federal and State Courts, 20 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 1063, 1090 (2019).
187. Id. at 1089–90.
188. Id. at 1090.
189. See id.
190. Id.
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tion, whether the obligation was judicially created, mandated
by statute, or stipulated in the parties’ pre-dispute contract.’”191
The drafters of the Singapore Convention on Mediation might
have also been concerned with the issue of voluntariness, the
heart of mediation. Forcing a party into mediation could be
seen as contrary to this fundamental notion. However, whether
a pre-dispute or post-dispute agreement to mediate exists, like
any other contract, it should be enforced if it is entered into
voluntarily. Standard contract defenses, such as unconsciona-
bility or duress, already exist to prevent involuntary contracts
from being enforced.
The core of the New York Convention’s effectiveness is the
certainty it provides parties using arbitration to resolve their
disputes. This certainty derives not only from its near-
universal adoption, but also from the presumption of enforcea-
bility it provides to both arbitral awards and agreements to ar-
bitrate. UNCITRAL should strongly consider adopting an
amendment to the Singapore Convention on Mediation to pro-
vide for a similar dual-enforcement of both MSAs and agree-
ments to mediate. Given that much of its text is derived, or di-
rectly copied, from the New York Convention, the Singapore
Convention on Mediation should do the same for this amend-
ment. The Convention should specifically borrow the language
from Article II of the New York Convention, and merely substi-
tute “mediation” in place of “arbitration” as follows:
“Each Party to the Convention shall recognize an agreement
in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to
mediation all or any differences which have arisen or which
may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relation-
ship, whether contractual or not, concerning the subject mat-
ter capable of settlement by mediation.”192
This text arguably enhances the spirit of voluntariness in
mediation because it ensures that parties who have a written
agreement to mediate will be certain that mediation occurs. If a
party reneges on its agreement, there will be a presumption of
enforcement, thus helping ensure that meritorious claims suc-
191. Id. (quoting James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A
Systematic Look at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43,
105 (2006)).
192. See New York Convention, supra note 48, art. II for the text from
which this proposed amendment borrows.
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ceed while preventing the costs of a protracted litigation. Fur-
thermore, even with this added language, the Convention still
would not require that the parties make a contractual agree-
ment to mediate before actually entering into mediation and
creating an MSA (which itself will have a presumption of en-
forceability under the Convention). However, if such an
amendment is ever drafted, it should be drafted soon. As more
members sign the Convention it becomes an increasingly diffi-
cult political challenge to bring many states together to agree
on a new convention.193
Even if an amendment is never drafted or passed, the afore-
mentioned strengths of the Convention still far outweigh this
weakness. It should also be noted that, even under the New
York Convention, there are still limits on the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate.194 If there is a dispute about whether
the claims were covered by the arbitration clause and are arbi-
tral, the matter may go to court.195 In the United States, the
Supreme Court has made clear that the presumption is that a
court—rather than an arbitral tribunal—will decide a question
of arbitrability de novo.196 This presumption can only be un-
done if there is “ ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence” that it was
the parties’ intent for the arbitrators to decide arbitrability.197
This is nonetheless a reflection of United States policy that
heavily favors arbitration, and merely ensures that the proper
claims are being arbitrated.198 If there is no question of arbi-
trability, however, the New York Convention has a presump-
tion of enforcement for arbitration.199 The parties can thus be
sure that all the appropriate claims will be settled through ar-
bitration.200
193. See Brekoulakis, supra note 54, at 443.
194. See generally Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71–72
(2010) (explaining the doctrine of severability as it pertains to arbitration
clauses); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995)
(discussing what claims are arbitrable and in what situations the court or the
arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability).
195. See, e.g. Jackson, 561 U.S. at 71; First Options, 514 U.S. at 942–47.
196. First Options, 514 U.S. 938, 947–48.
197. Id. at 944 (quoting AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commun. Workers of Am.,
475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).
198. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
631 (1985); see First Options 514 U.S. at 944–45 (1995).
199. New York Convention, supra note 48, art. I.
200. See generally Jackson, 561 U.S. at 68–71; Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942–47.
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CONCLUSION
While mediation is by no means a perfect form of ADR, and
the Singapore Convention on Mediation is by no means a per-
fect convention, the future of international commercial media-
tion looks to be bright. International mediation cannot, howev-
er, reach its highest possible effectiveness without providing
certainty for the enforcement of agreements to mediation. Nev-
ertheless, the lack of any international enforcement mecha-
nism, the previous major flaw hampering the use of mediation,
is still largely remedied by the Singapore Convention on Medi-
ation. As such, and because of mediation’s advantages over ar-
bitration and litigation, the use of mediation may—and
should—rise. All that remains is for more countries to ratify
the Convention. Once more countries do so, businesses will be
even more inclined to contract to settle their disputes through
mediation. If businesses are still hesitant to rely solely on me-
diation, even after the global growth of the Singapore Conven-
tion on Mediation, then perhaps its drafters should consider
giving the enforceability of hybrid dispute resolution tech-
niques a second look too.
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